Mercer Law Review
Volume 66
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 9

7-2015

Trial Practice and Procedure
John O'Shea Sullivan
Ashby K. Fox
Tala Amirfazli

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Sullivan, John O'Shea; Fox, Ashby K.; and Amirfazli, Tala (2015) "Trial Practice and Procedure," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 66 : No. 4 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol66/iss4/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby K. Fox**
and Tala Amirfazli***

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2014 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to
federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression.1 This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh
Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of statutory interpretation, subject matter jurisdiction, arbitration, and civil procedure.

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1995); Managing Editor (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
** Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2000); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with
honors, 2003). Member, Emory International Law Review (2001-2002); Notes and
Comments Editor (2002-2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., cum laude, 2010); Georgia State University College of Law, (J.D., with
honors, 2013). Member, Georgia State Law Review (2011-2013); Legislative Editor (20122013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of trial practice and procedure during the prior survey period, see
John O'Shea Sullivan, Ashby K. Fox & Tala Amirfazli, Trial Practice and Procedure,
Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 65 MERCER L. REV. 1105 (2014).

1045

1046

MERCER LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 66

ARBITRATION

A. Whether a District Court's Order Compelling Arbitration and
Administratively Closing, but Not Dismissing, the District Court Case
Is a Final Appealable Order
In Martinez v. Carnival Corp.,2 the Eleventh Circuit held that a
district court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration and
administrative closing, but not dismissing the case, was a final
appealable order because, regardless of its label or form, the order ended
the litigation on the merits and left nothing for the district court to do
but execute the judgment. 3
The dispute in Martinez arose between an employee (Martinez) and
his employer (Carnival) and involved back injuries that Martinez
suffered during his employment with Carnival.4 Martinez sued
Carnival in Florida state court, "asserting claims of Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance
and cure." Because Martinez's employment agreement with Carnival
contained an arbitration clause,' Carnival removed the action to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and
filed a motion to compel arbitration.7 After the district court granted
Carnival's motion to compel arbitration, dismissed all other pending
motions as moot, and "closed the case for administrative purposes,"
Martinez appealed.'
Carnival argued that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to
consider the appeal because the district court's order compelling
arbitration was not a final appealable decision. 9 Carnival claimed that,
because the district court granted the motion to compel and closed the
case for administrative purposes but did not dismiss the case, the order

2. 744 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 1245.
4. Id. at 1242-43.
5. Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (providing a cause of action for seamen injured
"in the course of employment").
6. Martinez, 744 F.3d at 1243 ("The Seafarer's Agreement, which covered the terms of
Martinez's employment, included an arbitration clause stating that, except for wage
disputes, 'any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement,
including any question regarding its existence, validity, or termination, or Seafarer's
service on the vessel, shall be referred to and fimally resolved by arbitration.'" (quoting the
Seafarer's Agreement)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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was "more akin to a stay of the proceedings," and thus it was "an
interlocutory order that may not be appealed under § 16(bX3)" of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).10
Addressing the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated,
The pertinent question we address in this case is not whether the
district court's administrative closure is the functional equivalent of a
dismissal, but rather, whether the district court's order, on the record
before us, ended the litigation on the merits and left nothing more for
the district court to do but execute the judgment."
In determining whether the district court's order was "final," the
Eleventh Circuit cited the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.Randolph," which defined a
final decision as one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment."" The
circuit court also noted that it and the Supreme Court adopted a
functional test for finality, and the appellate court must look "to the
practical effect of the district court's order, not to its form" in determining whether the order is "final" for purposes of appeal.' 4
Applying this functional test, the Eleventh Circuit held in Martinez
that the district court's order was "a functionally final and appealable
decision" because it not only administratively closed the case, but it also
denied all pending motions as moot and compelled arbitration. 15
Because the district court's order did not stay the proceedings, did not
contemplate any further action by the district court on the case, and "left
all further merits determinations to the arbitrator," the Eleventh Circuit
held that the order left "nothing more [for the district court] to decide,
and [the district court] effectively and functionally has issued a decision

10.

Id. at 1244; see also 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3) (2012). In considering Carnival's argument,

the Eleventh Circuit noted that "a district court order compelling arbitration and
dismissing a plaintiffs claim is a final decision within the meaning of § 16(a)(3)," whereas
"a district court order compelling arbitration and staying the proceedings before the court
is an interlocutory order that cannot be appealed." Martinez, 744 F.3d at 1244; see also 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).

11. Martinez, 744 F.3d at 1244.
12. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
13. Martinez, 744 F.3d at 1243-44 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 531 U.S. at 86).
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that under the FAA, a party may appeal "a final
decision with respect to an arbitration," whereas a party may not appeal "an interlocutory
order ... compelling arbitration." Id. at 1244 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C.

§ 16(aX3), (bX3)).
14. Id. at 1244.
15. Id. at 1245.
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that 'ends the litigation on the merits.' 16 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit held that under the facts in Martinez, the district court's order
operated as "afinal decision with respect to an arbitration" over which
Circuit had appellate jurisdiction under § 16(aX3) of the
the Eleventh
17
FAA.

The court's holding in Martinez emphasized a determination of finality
for purposes of appeal under the FAA will not rest on the title of the
order alone (that is, labeling an order as an administrative closure as
opposed to a dismissal)."8 Instead, finality depends on the order's
practical effect and whether the order ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing further for the district court to do in the case.19
III.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Whether a Party in Default May File an Untimely Answer Under
the "Good Cause" Standardor the More Stringent "Excusable Neglect"
Standard
In Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A.,20 the Eleventh Circuit held that a
plaintiff's request for leave to file an untimely answer to the defendant's
counterclaim should have been analyzed as a motion to set aside an
entry of default judgment, even though the request for leave to file an
untimely answer was made in response to the defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings.2 1 The dispute in Perez arose out of the
plaintiff's (Perez) failure to answer the defendant's (Wells Fargo)
counterclaim in Perez's lawsuit for claims arising out of Wells Fargo's
closing of Perez's bank accounts and its refusal to return the money in
her accounts.2 2 After Wells Fargo removed to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, it filed its answer

16. Id. at 1244 (quoting Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 779 (2014)).
17. Id. at 1245 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 1244-45.
20. 774 F.3d 1329 (l1th Cir. 2014).
21. Id. at 1339, 1342.
22. Id. at 1331-33. Perez had three business accounts with Wells Fargo, and at the
time of the dispute, the accounts held approximately $100,000. By letter, Wells Fargo
informed Perez that it had made "a business decision to end [Perez's] deposit account relationship,'" and had blocked all monetary transactions and had deactivated the cards linked
to Perez's accounts. Id. at 1332 (alteration in original). Perez contended that Wells Fargo
failed to provide her with "any plausible explanation of why [her] bank accounts... were
closed" and "refused to return the money in her accounts," so Perez filed her lawsuit in the
superior court. Id. (alteration in original).
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and counterclaim against Perez in the district court.' When Perez
failed to file an answer, Wells Fargo moved under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) 24 for judgment on the pleadings.2 5 Although no
default had been entered against Perez, she responded to Wells Fargo's
motion with a request for leave to file an out-of-time answer to the
counterclaim and asked the district court to apply the standards under
Rule 5526 for allowing an untimely answer. The district court denied
Perez's request to file an answer and granted Wells Fargo's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, holding that under the "excusable neglect"
standard of Rule 6(b)(1B), 28 Perez failed to show excusable neglect
because her attorney's excuse "for the delay in filing was insufficient to
relieve Perez of the consequences of the missed deadline."' Accordingly, the district court deemed all of Wells Fargo's allegations in its
counterclaim as true when it considered and granted Wells Fargo's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.3"
Perez appealed, arguing that the district court should not have denied
her motion to file an untimely answer and should not have granted
Wells Fargo's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 31 The Eleventh

23. Id. at 1332. Wells Fargo's counterclaim against Perez alleged that it had closed
Perez's accounts pursuant to the contract between Wells Fargo and Perez that allowed
Wells Fargo to close and freeze Perez's accounts after several United States Treasury
checks were deposited into the account. Depositing United States Treasury checks
constituted money services business activity, and Perez's three accounts were not approved
for money services business activity. Id. In its counterclaim, Wells Fargo further alleged
that it "had received a letter from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notifying Wells Fargo
that it had 'issued tax refunds that it should not have issued' and that it claimed an
interest in the funds in Perez's accounts." Id. at 1333. Because the IRS and Perez both
claimed right to the funds in the accounts, Wells Fargo included a claim against the United
States for interpleader to resolve the dispute. Finally, Wells Fargo also sought its
litigation costs and attorney fees. Id. In response to Wells Fargo's counterclaim, the
United States filed an answer explaining that although the IRS had sent the letter to Wells
Fargo, it "had determined that the United States had 'no right' to the funds in Perez's
accounts," and thus the United States repudiated any interest in the funds in the accounts.
Id. The United States was dismissed from the action by stipulation. Id. After the United
States repudiated any interest in the funds in the accounts, Wells Fargo returned the
money in Perez's accounts to Perez less $10,000 for the "costs and attorneys' fees" Wells
Fargo incurred in closing the accounts and defending against Perez's claims. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
25. Perez, 774 F.3d at 1333.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
27. Perez, 774 F.3d at 1333-34.
28. FED. R. CIv. P. 6(bX1XB).
29. Perez, 774 F.3d at 1334.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1335.
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Circuit agreed and reversed the district court, noting that by taking as
true the allegations in Wells Fargo's counterclaim for purposes of
considering its motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the district court
essentially conducted the analysis for determining whether a motion for
default judgment should be granted."3 2 The Eleventh Circuit explained,
redundantly, that "a motion for an entry of default judgment is a motion
for an entry of default judgment is a motion for an entry of default
judgment is a motion for an entry of default judgment-even if its writer
calls it a motion for judgment on the pleadings."' Although Wells
Fargo filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking deemed
admissions of all of the allegations in the counterclaim, the court found
the district court "essentially conducted the analysis applicable on a
motion for default judgment... not the analysis applicable on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. " '
Rule 55 governs default judgments and provides, "[wihen a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or
otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default."35 Rule 12(c)
governs motions for judgment on the pleadings and provides "a means
of disposing of cases when... a judgment on the merits can be achieved
by focusing on the content of the competing pleadings" 36 after "the
pleadings are closed."37 Because Perez failed to file an answer to the
counterclaims, the district court was precluded from entering a judgment
on the pleadings because the pleadings had not yet closed and there
were no competing pleadings. 3' The court noted that "the proper course

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1335-36.
FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

Perez, 774 F.3d at 1336 (quoting 5C CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1367 (3d ed. 2004)).

37. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).
38. Id. at 1337. Under Rule 12(c), a party is permitted to fie a motion for judgment
on the pleadings "only after the pleadings have closed" and "early enough not to delay
trial." Id. at 1336 (quoting FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(c)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule
7(a) sets forth a limited list of permissible pleadings that are allowed:
(1) a complaint;
(2) an answer to a complaint;
(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;
(4) an answer to a cross claim;
(5) a third-party complaint;
(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and
(7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.

20151

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1051

for the plaintiff in a case in which the defendant fails to answer is to
move for a default judgment

. ..

rather than seek a judgment on the

pleadings." 9
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court should have
applied the "good cause" standard in Rule 55 to determine whether Perez
could file an untimely answer as opposed to the "more rigorous excusable
neglect standard" in Rule 6(bX1XB).4 ° Under the "good cause" standard, a counter-defendant should be permitted to file an untimely
answer so long as the failure to file or the delay was not "willful or
contumacious." 1 Further, the Eleventh Circuit has "long expressed
[its] 'strong policy of determining cases on their merits." 2 Ultimately,
the Eleventh Circuit held that although Perez was in default on Wells
Fargo's counterclaim, her request for leave to file an untimely answer
"should have been analyzed as a motion to set aside an entry of default
judgment under the more forgiving ["good cause"] standard," and the
Eleventh Circuit remanded the action for the district court to consider
Perez's request to file an untimely answer under that standard.43

FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a). "[Tjhe pleadings do not 'close' until an answer has been filed by the

counter-defendant." Perez, 774 F.3d at 1336. The Eleventh Circuit further noted,
[Tihe name of Rule 12(c), which incorporates the plural of'pleading'-Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings'-along with the use of the plural 'pleadings' as
opposed to the singular 'pleading' throughout the rule, supports the idea that
judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate when only a single pleading related
to a claim.., has been filed.
Id. at 1337 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).
39. Perez, 774 F.3d at 1337 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 36, at § 1367
("Since the plaintiff cannot move under Rule 12(c) until [the pleadings close], the proper
course for the plaintiff in a case in which the defendant fails to answer is to move for a
default judgment under Rule 55 rather than seek ajudgment on the pleadings.") (alteration
in original).
40. Id. at 1338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. (quoting Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. MN Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir.
2005)).
42. Id. at 1339 (quoting Fla. Physician's Ins. Co v. Ehlers, 8 F.3d 780, 783 (11th Cir.
1993)).
43. Id.
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B. Whether a District Court Can Dismiss a Removed Action Without
Prejudice to Allow the Plaintiffto Re-File the Action in State Court
and Invoke the Forum-DefendantRule to Prevent a Subsequent
Removal of the Action to Federal Court
In Goodwin v. Reynolds," the Eleventh Circuit examined whether 4a5
district court properly granted a plaintiff's motion under Rule 41(aX2)
to dismiss a removed action without prejudice.4" The plaintiff's sole
(and stated) purpose in seeking the dismissal was to re-file the action in
state court in a manner designed to invoke the "forum-defendant rule"
of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(bX2), 47 thereby precluding a second removal to
district court by the defendants. 48 The Eleventh Circuit held that
because the plaintiff intended to prosecute her claims against the forum
defendant in good faith, and because the defendants' right to removal
was based on a technicality and was not a "substantial right," the
district court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff's motion
to dismiss. 9
The lawsuit from which this appeal arose involved a fatal car accident
with a tractor-trailer. The plaintiff (Goodwin) filed a complaint in
Alabama state court against the driver of the tractor-trailer (Reynolds),
Reynolds's employer (Fikes Truck Line), and the operator of the facility
that was expecting a delivery from Reynolds at the time of the accident
(Precoat Metals). The parties were completely diverse in citizenship,
and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Reynolds was a citizen
of Alabama-the forum state. 50
On the day Goodwin filed the lawsuit, she requested and paid for
service of process on all of the defendants, and she sent each defendant
a courtesy copy of her complaint. Upon receiving the courtesy copies
(but before any of the defendants had been served), Fikes Truck Line
and Precoat Metals removed the action to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama based on diversity jurisdiction.51 Goodwin moved to remand the action to state court based on the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

757 F.3d 1216 (2014).
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1218-19.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012).
Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1218-19.
Id. at 1222.

50. Id. at 1218. "[Goodwin] is a citizen of Ohio. Reynolds is a citizen of Alabama, [the
forum state]. Fikes [Truck Line] is a citizen of Arkansas. Precoat [Metals] is a citizen of
Delaware and Missouri." Id. at 1218 n.3.
51. Id. at 1218. The plaintiff filed the complaint on Thursday, December 29, 2011.
Fikes Truck Line and Precoat Metals, the non-forum defendants, removed the action on
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"forum-defendant rule," which provides that a state court action that is
removable to federal court solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship
is not removable if any of the parties "properly joined and served" as a
defendant are citizens of the forum state." Alternatively, Goodwin
moved to dismiss the action without prejudice to invoke the forumdefendant rule by re-filing the suit against the forum defendant
(Reynolds) first by serving him with process, and then joining the nonforum defendants. The district court denied Goodwin's motion to
remand but granted her motion to dismiss, and the court dismissed the
action without prejudice.53
After the district court denied Fikes Truck Line and Precoat Metal's
motion to alter or amend the dismissal order, all three defendants jointly
appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
granting Goodwin's motion to dismiss because dismissal defeated the
defendants' "substantial" right to removal.' The defendants relied on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Thatcher v. HanoverInsurance Group,5 5 when the circuit court reversed
a district court's order granting a plaintiff's motion to voluntarily
dismiss upon concluding that the plaintiff's motion to dismiss in an
effort to defeat removal and avoid federal jurisdiction was an "improper
forum-shopping measure. " "

Wednesday, January 4, 2012. Due to personnel shortages in the state court clerk's office,
there was a delay in processing the service packages for defendants. As of January 17,
2012, the service packages intended for defendants still had not been processed. Precoat
Metals filed an answer to the complaint along with the notice of removal, which precluded
Goodwin "from dismissing the case without a court order pursuant to Rule 41(aX1XA)(i)."
Id. at 1218 & n.5, 1219; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 41(aXl)(AXi).
52. Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1218 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006)).
53. Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1219 & n.6.
54. Id. at 1219. The Eleventh Circuit noted that, although "inmost cases a dismissal
should be granted unless the defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice, other than the
mere prospect of a subsequent lawsuit, as a result," id. (quoting McCants v. Ford Motor
Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1986)), dismissal nonetheless may be inappropriate "if
it would cause the defendant to lose a 'substantial right." Id. (quoting Pontenberg v. Bos.
Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)).
55. 659 F.3d 1212 (8th Cir. 2011).
56. Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Thatcher, 659 F.3d at 1215). In Thatcher,the
plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in state court. 659 F.3d at 1213. After the
defendants removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012), the plaintiff moved to dismiss the action without prejudice.
Thatcher,659 F.3d at 1213. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding
that "a party is not permitted to dismiss merely... to seek a more favorable forum." Id.
at 1214 (quoting Hamm v. Rhone-Poulene Rorer Pharms., Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 950 (8th Cir.
1999)).
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Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that, under Thatcher, "a
defendant who properly removes an action to federal court may at least
sometimes acquire a 'substantial right' to have the case heard in a
federal forum,"57 it pointed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit's contrary holding in American NationalBank & Trust
Co. of Sapula v. Bic Corp.5" as evidence of "some general disagreement
[among the Circuits] regarding the substantiality of a defendant's right
of removal." 9 In American National Bank, the Tenth Circuit held that
"it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to dismiss an action
without prejudice even where the plaintiff's only motive is to recommence the action in state court."60 However, the Eleventh Circuit held
that it need not address or attempt to reconcile this circuit split based
on the facts of Goodwin, which it found to be distinguishable from both
Thatcher and American National Bank & Trust Co."' The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that in those cases "the removability of the case was
based on the substance of the action," whereas in Goodwin, the
removability was "based on a technicality" because Goodwin would not
be modifying the substance of her complaint in order to prevent a second
removal.6 2 The Eleventh Circuit held this difference "indicat[es] that
the Defendants' right of removal [in Goodwin], if any, was not as
substantial as in Thatcher and American National Bank [& Trust
Co.]."63 The court further concluded that "Defendants' right of removal
[in Goodwin], if any, was not at the core of what the removal statute protects.'

The Eleventh Circuit noted that in Fletcherthe plaintiffs "expressed intent was to drop
certain claims 'in order to avoid federal jurisdiction' and that [the plaintiffl had not
explained how his proposed amendments to the complaint would benefit the putative
class." Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1219-20 (quoting Thatcher, 659 F.3d at 1214).
57. Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1219.
58. 931 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1991).
59. Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1220.
60. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 931 F.2d at 1413. In American National Bank &
Trust Co., the plaintiffs fied an action in state court, and after the defendant removed the
action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the
action without prejudice. Id. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma's order of dismissal, explaining that
"if the plaintiffs refiled the action in state court and, in good faith, joined additional
defendants that were citizens of the forum, 'the trial may appropriately be in state court,
as defendant has no right to trial in federal court.'" Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1220 (quoting
Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 931 F.2d at 1412-13).
61. Goodwin, 757 F.3d at 1220.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. The Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that the case was removable at the
time the non-forum defendants removed it, although this issue was not before the court on
appeal. Id. at 1220 n. 12.
64. Id. at 1220-21.
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In holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting Goodwin's motion to dismiss, the Eleventh Circuit held "[the
forum-defendant rule clearly contemplates [Goodwin's] ability to defeat
Defendants' purported right of removal in this case." 5 Because the
forum-defendant rule only applies if a forum defendant has been
"properly joined and served," the district court found the case was
removable because Reynolds, the forum defendant, had not yet been
served when Fikes Truck Lines and Precoat Metals (the non-forum
defendants) removed the case.6 However, the Eleventh Circuit noted
if Reynolds had been formally served before Fikes Truck Lines and
Precoat Metals removed the action, the forum-defendant rule indisputably would have prevented removal to federal court.67 The court
criticized the defendants' apparent gamesmanship with respect to
removal, pointing out "[tihe only reason this case is in federal court is
that the non-forum defendants accomplished a pre-service removal by
exploiting, first, Plaintiff's courtesy in sending them copies of the
complaint and, second, the state court's delay in processing Plaintiff's
diligent request for service.'
The court also held that accepting the defendants' arguments under
the facts of Goodwin would subvert the "properly joined and served"
language of the forum-defendant rule.6 9 The court explained the
"properly joined and served" language in the statute was purposefully
included by the legislature "to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal
by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom [the plaintiff]
does not intend to proceed, and whom [the plaintiff] does not even
serve."7 ° Under this interpretation of the statutory language and
purpose, the court concluded, "we cannot believe that it constrains the
district court's discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) to undo Defendants'
gamesmanship" in hurriedly removing the action before the forum
defendant (or any defendant) was properly served."
In contrast to what it characterized as the defendants' "gamesmanship," the court also focused on what it believed (or assumed) to be
Goodwin's good faith intentions with respect to the prosecution of her

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1221.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)).
Id.
Id. The court stated that the "Defendants would have us tie the district court's

hands in the face of such gamesmanship on the part of Defendants." Id.

69. Id.
70. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp.
2d 640, 645 (D.N.J. 2008)).
71. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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claims against the forum defendant, Reynolds.72 Specifically, the court
saw "no indication that Plaintiff fraudulently joined the forum defendant, Reynolds, for the sole purpose of triggering the forum-defendant
rule," but instead observed "every indication that Plaintiff intended to
prosecute her claims against Reynolds, who was allegedly driving the
truck that killed Plaintiff's husband."73 The court also held the
defendants "did not lose any 'substantial right' by the dismissal," and
there was "no indication that Defendants suffered any prejudice from the
dismissal, other than the loss of their preferred federal forum."74
The conclusions in Goodwin raise the question of whether (and to
what extent) the court properly relied on its unsupported assumptions
regarding the plaintiff's "intentions," properly presumed good faith with
respect to the prosecution of her claims against the forum defendant in
presuming that Reynolds was in fact "properly joined and served" as
required for the forum-defendant rule to apply to bar removal, or both.
Of similar concern is the court's characterization of the defendants' right
of removal as a "technicality" and not a "substantial right" that the
removal statutes were intended to protect, notwithstanding that the
action presumably was properly removable and the defendants were
entitled to remove the case under the forum-defendant rule because the
non-forum defendants opted to remove the case before the forumdefendant was served.
C. Whether a Defendant May Moot a Class Action Through an
Unaccepted Rule 68 Offer of Complete Relief to the Named Plaintiffs,
but Not to the Class Members, Before the Named PlaintiffsMove to
Certify the Class
In Stein v. Buccaneers L.P, 7 the Eleventh Circuit addressed two
issues of first impression regarding the impact of an unaccepted Rule
6876 offer of judgment in the context of a Rule 237' class action: (1)
"whether an individual plaintiffs claim becomes moot when the plaintiff
does not accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment that [offers complete] relief';
and (2) if so, and if such offers of complete relief are made to all of the
named plaintiffs before they move to certify the class, whether that
prevents the named plaintiffs from proceeding as class representa-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
772 F.3d 698 (2014).
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
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tives.75 In both instances, the court joined the majority of circuits
finding the answer to be no.79
The lawsuit at the foundation of this appeal arose out of alleged
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act' and was filed in
Florida state court.81 The named plaintiffs allegedly received unsolicited faxes advertising tickets to National Football League games from the
defendant, Buccaneers Limited Partnership (BLP), and were seeking "to
represent a nationwide class of recipients of the unsolicited faxes." 2
BLP removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, and three days later served an offer of judgment
under Rule 68 that, if accepted, would have provided complete relief to
each named plaintiff.' Two days after serving the offers of judgment
on the named plaintiffs (but before the named plaintiffs moved to certify
the class), BLP moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the unaccepted
offers of judgment rendered the case moot. The district court agreed,
and granted BLP's motion to dismiss. The named plaintiffs, who did not
accept the offers of judgment and did not receive any judgment against
BLP, appealed.'"

78. Stein, 772 F.3d at 700, 702.
79. Id. at 700.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
81. Stein, 772 F.3d at 700. The complaint alleged that defendant Buccaneers Limited
Partnership (BLP) "sent unsolicited faxes to the named plaintiffs and more than 100,000
others, that the faxes advertised tickets to National Football League games involving the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and that sending the unsolicited faxes violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ... .1and its implementing regulations." Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id. The plaintiffs were seeking "statutory damages of $500 per violation, trebled
to $1,500 based on BLP's [alleged] willfulness, and an injunction against further violations
[of the TCPAI." Id.
83. Id. at 700-01. The offer of judgment to the first named plaintiff (who claimed to
have received three unsolicited faxes) provided in pertinent part
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant, [BLP1,
hereby offers to allow Judgment to be entered against it in this action in the
amount of $4,500.00 as well as all reasonable costs incurred to date by JEFFREY
M. STEIN, D.D.S., M.S.D., PA. to be decided by the Court, and an entry of a
stipulated injunction enjoining the Defendant from any future violations of [the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act]. The offer extended herein is intended to
fully satisfy the individual claims of JEFFREY M. STEIN, D.D.S., M.S.D., P.A.
Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The substance of the offers to the five other named plaintiffs
was identical except for the amount of the offers, which were based on the number of
unsolicited faxes the complaint alleged each named plaintiff received. Id. at 701.
84. Id. at 701. After BLP filed its motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs hurriedly moved to
certify the class, but did so "long before the deadline under the Local Rules for filing such
was
a motion." Id. The district court denied the motion to certify the class, stating that "it
terse and admittedly (in fact purposefully) premature." Id. (internal quotation marks
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed two issues of first
impression regarding whether the unaccepted Rule 68 offers of judgment
First, the court addressed "whether an
rendered the action moot.'
individual plaintiff's claim becomes moot when the plaintiff does not
accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment that, if accepted, would provide all
the relief the plaintiff seeks.""6 Second, the court addressed "whether,
if the answer [to the first question] is yes and such offers are made to all
the named plaintiffs in the proposed class action before they move to
certify a class, the named plaintiffs may nonetheless go forward as class
representatives." 7
The court answered both questions in the negative.88 First, in
holding that the unaccepted offers of judgment did not render the named
plaintiffs' individual claims moot, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the
plain language of Rule 68, which provides that an unaccepted offer of
judgment is deemed "withdrawn." 9 The court relied on the dissenting
opinion in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk," when United States
Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan explained that an unaccepted offer
of judgment cannot moot a named plaintiff's individual claims because
"[wihen a plaintiff rejects such an offer... her interest in the lawsuit
remains just what it was before."' Justice Kagan further reasoned
that "[an unaccepted settlement offer-like any unaccepted contract

omitted).
85. Id. at 702. "A case is moot 'when it no longer presents a live controversy with
respect to which the court can give meaningful relief." Id. (quoting Cameron-Grant v.
Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir. (2003)). In order to have
a valid claim, "[a] plaintiff must have 'a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.' [. ..]
And this must be true from beginning to end, not just when the case is filed." Id. (citations
omitted) (quoting Cameron-Grant,347 F.3d at 1245).
86. Id. at 702.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 709.
89. Id. at 702 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 68(b)).
90. 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013). In Symczyk, a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012 & Supp. 2014), the parties stipulated that an
unaccepted Rule 68 offer ofjudgment mooted the individual plaintiffs claim. See Synzyk,
133 S. Ct. at 1527, 1529. The majority accepted the stipulation without addressing the
issue. Id. at 1529.
91. Stein, 770 F.3d at 703 (quoting Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
Justice Kagan states that the "thrice-asserted view [that the defendant's offer mooted the
plaintiffs individual claims] is wrong, wrong, and wrong again" because "[als long as the
parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case
is not moot." Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Charm v. Chafm, 133 S. Ct. 1017,
1023 (2013)). Justice Kagan explains that "[a] case becomes moot only when it is
impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party." Id.
(quoting Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1023).
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offer-is a legal nullity, with no operative effect" because "the recipient's
rejection of an offer 'leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been
made."9 2 In Stein, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Smyczyk
dissent,9 3 heeded Justice Kagan's warning to the circuits to not adopt
a "mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory,"94 and reversed the district
court's order dismissing the action as moot.95
Second, the Eleventh Circuit held that even if the named plaintiffs'
individual claims were rendered moot by the unaccepted offers of
judgment, the class claims remained live and the named plaintiffs
retained the ability to pursue those claims as class representatives. 9
In so holding, the court relied on binding circuit precedent9 7 and joined
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits in concluding that "a Rule 68 offer of full relief to the
named plaintiff does not moot a class action, even if the offer precedes

92. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1533 (quoting Minneapolis & S.L. Ry. v. Columbus Rolling
Mill, 119 U.S. 149, 151 (1886)).
93. Stein, 772 F.3d at 703. The Eleventh Circuit explained that "Symczyk creates no
tension with our analysis of whether a Rule 68 offer moots an individual claim... because
the Court assumed without deciding that the individual claim at issue in Symczyk was
moot." Id. at 708.
94. Id. at 703 (quoting Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1534). The court explained,
[T]he legal relationship between BLP and the named plaintiffs was precisely the
same as before the offers were made: the named plaintiffs had claims against BLP
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act; BLP retained all its defenses; no
ruling had been made on the validity of the claims or defenses; and no judgment
had been entered. BLP had not paid the plaintiffs, was not obligated to pay the
plaintiffs, and had not been enjoined from sending out more faxes. The individual
claims were not moot.
Id. at 704.
95. Id. at 704. The Eleventh Circuit noted the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Diaz v. FirstAmerican Home Buyers ProtectionCorp., 732 F.3d 948 (9th
Cir. 2013), had expressly adopted the position set forth by the majority in Symczyk. Stein,
772 F.3d at 703. Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that, pre-Smyczyk, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Second Circuits had held "that an unaccepted Rule 68
offer for full relief moots an individual claim," even these circuits "said a plaintiffs claims
could not just be dismissed as was done here; the proper approach, the courts said, was to
enter judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the unaccepted offer." Id.
96. Stein, 772 F.3d at 704.
97. Id. Specifically, the court relied on Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d
1030 (5th Cir. 1981), which held that a purported but uncertified class action should not
be dismissed for mootness upon tender of full relief to the named plaintiffs on their
individual claims if the named plaintiffs had timely filed and diligently pursued a motion
for class certification. Stein, 772 F.3d at 704; see also Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 1041-42.
Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Zeidman was
issued before October 1, 1981, "the decision is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit."
Stein, 772 F.3d at 704.
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a class-certification motion, so long as the named plaintiff has not failed
to diligently pursue class certification." 5 The Eleventh Circuit also
relied on substantial Supreme Court precedent supporting the holding
that a purported but uncertified class action should not be dismissed for
mootness based upon a defendant's tender of full relief to the named
plaintiffs, regardless of whether the tender came before or after the class
certification motion was filed, where the disputes at issue are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review."99 In Stein, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that under these circumstances, the named plaintiffs'
petition for class certification should not be dismissed for mootness
because: (1) even though "[tihey had not yet moved to certify a class
when BLP served its offers of judgment," the filing of such a motion at
that time "would have been premature, as the district court explicitly
recognized in denying the certification motion filed just three days after
service of the Rule 68 offers";0 0 and (2) the claims at issue "were
capable of repetition, yet evading review" because the defendant had "the
ability by tender to each named plaintiff effectively to prevent any
plaintiff in the class from procuring a decision on class certification."" 1

98. Stein, 772 F.3d at 707. The court noted that this view was not unanimous and
that at least one court--the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011)--would have supported

afflirmance of the district court's order in Stein, because that court focused on the timing
of the defendant's tender, and held that "if the offer to the named plaintiff is made before
the plaintiff moves to certify a class, the named plaintiff cannot go forward." Stein, 772

F.3d at 708. However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with this approach, finding that it
"would produce unnecessary and premature certification motions in some cases and
unnecessary gamesmanship in others." Id.
99. Stein, 772 F.3d at 705 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,399-400 (1975)). The
Eleventh Circuit cited numerous Supreme Court decisions which supported this holding.
Id. at 705-07. The Eleventh Circuit cited Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), to explain
that "the necessary personal stake in a live class-action controversy sometimes is present
even when the named plaintiffs own individual claim has become moot." Stein, 772 F.3d
at 705. Next, the Eleventh Circuit cited the holding in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975), recognizing "that a class-action may not be moot when individual claims become
moot before certification." Stein, 772 F.3d at 705-06. The Eleventh Circuit then cited
Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978), which held that a "class certification related back
to the filing of the complaint" and "not to the date when the plaintiffs moved to certify the
class." Stein, 772 F.3d at 706. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the holding in
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), "[tihat class was not certified until
after the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot does not deprive [the court] of
jurisdiction." Stein, 772 F.3d at 706 (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52).
100. Stein, 772 F.3d at 707.
101. Id. (quoting Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 1050).
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Circuit held its reversal was supported
For these reasons, the Eleventh
10 2
by "alternative holdings."
IV.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS
ACT

A. Whether the $5 Million Amount-in-Controversy Requirement in the
Class Action FairnessAct Can Be Satisfied By Claims Only for
DeclaratoryRelief
In Southern Florida Wellness v. Allstate Insurance Co.,103 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the $5 million amount-in-controversy
requirement for federal subject matter jurisdiction in the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA) °4 can be satisfied even if the plaintiff only seeks
declaratory relief.105
The claims arose out of the terms of the personal-injury-protection
(PIP) coverage in an insurance policy issue by the defendant (Allstate).
The plaintiff(Wellness) was a healthcare provider that provided medical
treatment to a patient insured by Allstate under a policy with PIP.'
After Allstate failed to pay Wellness for its services, Wellness filed a
putative class action in Florida state court seeking a declaration that the
form language in Allstate's insurance policies with PIP did not clearly
and unambiguously indicate payments would be limited by the statutory
fee schedule as required by a recent Florida Supreme Court decision.0 7

102. Id. at 709 ("We resolve this case based on alternative holdings. First, a plaintiffs
individual claim is not mooted by an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment. Second, a
proffer that moots a named plaintiffs individual claim does not moot a class action in
circumstances like those presented here, even if the proffer comes before the plaintiff has
moved to certify a class.").
103. 745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(dX2) (2012).
105. S. Fla. Wellness, 745 F.3d at 1313.
106. Id. After Florencio Sanchez was treated by Wellness for her injuries sustained in

an automobile accident, she assigned her right to benefits under her Allstate policy to
Wellness. Wellness sought payment of 80% of the total amount it had billed Sanchez, but
Allstate only paid Wellness 80% of certain amounts (set out in Florida's statutory fee
schedule) based on its interpretation of Sanchez's policy. Id. at 1313-14. Although the
general policy in Florida requires that an insurer cover "80% of all reasonable costs for
medically necessary treatment resulting from an automobile accident," which is the

payment Wellness sought from Allstate, Florida law also provides that "an insurer may opt
out of the general payment rule and instead limit payment to 80% of a statutory fee
schedule." Id. at 1314. Allstate claimed that "it opted out of the general payment rule in
favor of the more limited statutory fee schedule approach in its Florida PIP policies." Id.
107. Id. In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court issued a decision requiring "any insurer
choosing to limit payments to the statutory fee schedule to clearly and unambiguously
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Allstate removed the action to the United States District Court for the
08
Southern District of Florida asserting CAFA diversity jurisdiction.
Wellness moved to remand, arguing that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not exceed $5
million and that the potential financial effect of the requested declaratory judgment could not be considered because it was too speculative.' 9
The district court agreed that the amount-in-controversy requirement
had not been met because "the value of the declaratory relief [was] too
speculative" for purposes of satisfying CAFA as Allstate "failed to show
that 'declaratory judgment in this case will necessarily trigger a flow of
money to [the] plaintiffs."' 110
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that Allstate had satisfied its
burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million."' The court stated that
"how much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover" should not
discount the amount in controversy during the jurisdictional analysis.112

Even though Wellness's complaint did not assert a claim for

damages, the court should use the value of the declaratory relief
measured from the plaintiff's perspective in determining the amount in
controversy. 113

Wellness relied on Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Carl"4 to argue the
amount in controversy for its declaratory claim was too speculative for
the court to ascertain a value for the purpose of establishing federal
subject matter jurisdiction." 5 But the Eleventh Circuit explained that
indicate in the insurance policy that it is doing so." Id.
108. Id. Subject to diversity of citizenship requirements, CAFA provides in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2) that "[the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
109. S. Fla. Wellness, 745 F.3d at 1314-15. In support of its removal, Allstate
submitted an affidavit from an Allstate employee familiar with PIP claims that stated if
Allstate had not limited payment based on the statutory fee schedule, then the putative
class member would have been entitled to $194,651,033.94 in benefits. After subtracting
the amount Allstate paid to cover certain treatments, Allstate explained that the amount
in controversy was $68,176,817.69. Id. at 1314.
110. Id. at 1315 (alteration in original) (quoting S. Fla. Wellness v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 13-61759-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2013)).
111. Id. at 1315-16.
112. Id. at 1315 (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II., Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 751 (11th
Cir. 2010)).
113. Id. at 1315-16.
114. 279 F.3d 967 (11th Cir. 2002).
115. S. Fla. Wellness, 745 F.3d at 1316-17. Welness argued that if the declaratory
judgment was ordered in favor of the class, multiple events had to occur before any
putative class member could recover any money from Allstate. Thus, valuing the
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Wellness's speculation argument itself was too speculative because it
required indulging "the kind of 'conjecture, speculation, or star gazing'

that [the court has] found inappropriate in analyzing the amount in
controversy.""' The court also explained that Leonard was inapplicable because the court in Leonard held the injunctive relief, which sought
to prevent the defendant from selling automobile insurance to its
customers who rented automobiles from the defendant, "had no value"
because the plaintiffs were always free to refuse to purchase the
insurance. 1 7 Thus, the court in Leonard was unable to assign a
monetary value for the injunctive relief because the court "would have
to speculate as to how many future customers might purchase the
optional insurance absent an injunction."1 ' Unlike Leonard, which
involved "future transactions that were merely possible," the dispute in
South 119
Florida Wellness involved "past transactions that actually did
occur."

The court's holding in South Florida Wellness confirms that even
though it is possible that the members of the putative class may not
ultimately recover the full amount in controversy, "that possibility does
not shut the door on federal jurisdiction" as "the 'pertinent question [at
the jurisdictional stage] is what is in controversy in the case, not how
much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover.'" 2

declaratory judgment was "far too speculative." Id. at 1316. If the declaratory judgment
was ordered in favor of the class, a party seeking to recover PIP benefits would be required
to submit a pre-suit demand letter to its insurer for payment of benefits. Id. If the insurer
were to reject the demand for payment requiring the insured to file suit, the insured would
be entitled to payment only if the factfinder determines that the treatment was '(1) related
to an accident, (2) not medically necessary, or (3) for treatments billed at an unreasonable
rate." Id.
116. Id. (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754). The court explained that "[alithough the
putative class members might have to take an extra step or two after obtaining declaratory
relief to get money from Allstate, that does not mean that determining that the amount
in controversy exceeds $5 million is too speculative of a task." Id. at 1316-17 (footnote
omitted).
117. Id. at 1317.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1318 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d
at 751).
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B. Whether the Removing Defendant Has the Burden of Establishing
the Amount-in-Controversy Under CAFA Is Met When the Plaintiff
Disputes Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction?
In Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co.,"' the Eleventh Circuit held, based on
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
Co. v. Owens,'2 2 that it will no longer rely on a presumption in favor
of remand in jurisdictional questions under CAFA.l 2 If the plaintiff
challenges the amount-in-controversy allegation in the defendant's
removal papers, the burden to prove amount in12 4 controversy by a
preponderance of the evidence is on the defendant.
The lawsuit arose out of an employment dispute. The plaintiff
(Dudley) sued in Florida state court asserting the defendants, including
the plaintiff's employer (Lilly), failed to make incentive payments due to
plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. Asserting diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(dX2), Lilly removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.1 25
Dudley moved to remand, arguing the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because Lilly had not established the amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million. The district court agreed that Lilly
26
failed to establish the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.1
The Eleventh Circuit permitted Lilly to appeal the remand order.'27
The Eleventh Circuit held, after a de novo review, that under the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Dart the district court did not err in
determining that Lilly had failed to establish the required amount in
controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. 28 Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Dart, the Eleventh Circuit had construed

121. 778 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2014).
122. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).
123. Dudley, 778 F.3d at 912.
124. Id. at 912-13.

125. Id. at 910. CAFA provides federal subject matter jurisdiction over class actions
where "(1) any member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of a state different from the state
of citizenship of any defendant, (2) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,
and (3) the proposed plaintiff class contains at least 100 members." Id. at 911.
126. Id. at 910. More specifically, the district court held that "Lilly's proffers about the
amount in controversy were purely speculative because Lilly had failed to identify a specific
number of class participants made up of only those employees who did not receive their
promised compensation; and had failed to identify the amount each member was entitled
to receive as compensation." Id. at 910-11.
127. Id. at 911.
128. Id. at 911, 912-13.
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"removal statutes strictly and resolv[ed] doubts in favor of remand."'29
But after reviewing the legislative history of CAFA, the Supreme Court
"made clear that 'no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking
130
CAFA."
In Dart, the Supreme Court explained that "when a defendant seeks
federal-court adjudication, the defendant's amount-in-controversy
allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or
On the other hand, where, as in Dudley,
questioned by the court."1
the plaintiff contests the defendant's amount in controversy, "the district
court must find by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount
in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold."132 Based on this
analysis, the court found there was no subject matter jurisdiction under
CAFA because, on the "limited record" after Dudley challenged Lilly's
alleged amount in controversy, Lilly failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, after two attempts, that $5 million was in
controversy.13 3 However, the court left open the possibility for more
evidence of potential damages to come to light in state court, and Lilly
will likely have another opportunity to seek removal.134
V.

CONCLUSION

The 2014 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, a
number of which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh

129. Id. at 912 (quoting Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir.
2006)).
130. Id. (quoting Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 554). Prior to Dart, the Eleventh Circuit "had
presumed that in enacting CAFA, Congress had not intended to deviate from 'established
principles of state and federal common law.'" Id. (quoting Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1329). In
Dart,however, the Supreme Court "made clear" that the legislative history of CAFA and
the language in the legislative history requires that CAFA's "provisions should be read
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal
court if properly removed by any defendant." Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005)
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41).
131. Dart, 135 S.Ct. at 553.
132. Dudley, 778 F.3d at 913 (quoting Dart, 135 S.Ct. at 553-54) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under CAFA, "class actions may be removed at any point during the
pendency of litigation in state court, so long as removal is initiated within thirty days after
the defendant is put on notice that a case which was not removable based on the face of
the complaint has become removable." Id. Thus, "aCAFA defendant who fails to meet his
burden for removal at the early stages of litigation may still have recourse to the federal
courts later, after a fuller record has been developed in discovery in the state court." Id.
133. Id. at 915-16. In support of its notice of removal, Lilly presented two affidavits
providing calculations of the estimated range of monetary incentives potentially owed to
Dudley and the class of similarly situated individuals. Id. at 914-15.
134. Id. at 916.
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Circuit. While this Survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors
have attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners
by providing them with relevant updates in the area of federal trial
practice and procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.

